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ABSTRACT 
 The present study investigated cognitive influences on the malleability of memory for an 
eyewitness event, specifically focusing on age, executive function, and divided attention. 
Preschoolers (3- to 5-year-olds) and adults completed an executive function (EF) battery, 
witnessed an event either under divided attention (DA) or full attention (FA), following this, 
participants were asked a series of questions, the majority of which were misleading from the 
Video Suggestibility Scale for Children. This study supports previous findings that children are 
more suggestible than adults to misleading questions. However, there was no influence of EF on 
suggestibility in either children or adults. Lastly, level of attention was related to suggestibility in 
yield 1 scores, where those in the DA condition had higher suggestibility scores than those in the 
FA condition, supporting previous findings in adult literature and extending these findings to the 
preschool age.  
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I INTRODUCTION 
Cognitive Influences on Preschoolers’ and Adults’ Eyewitness Memory in Response to 
Misleading Questions 
It was estimated that over 13,000 children testify each year in sexual abuse cases (Ceci & 
Bruck, 1993), with 40.65% of these children being seven years of age and under (Scullin & Ceci, 
2001). Often, individuals (and especially children) interviewed during these cases encounter 
suggestive techniques that can lead to the creation of false memories (Neuschatz, Lampinen, 
Toglia, Payne, & Cisneros, 2007). These false memories can lead to drastic consequences, such 
as innocent persons being convicted. In fact, there are several hundred documented cases of 
innocent people being convicted of various crimes, with the Innocence Project exonerating by 
DNA at least 22 people convicted based on false testimonies of others (The Innocence Project, 
2017; Davis & Leo, 2012). In light of this information, research focused on better understanding 
the malleability of memory across the lifespan for witnessed events is necessary to assist in 
avoiding false convictions via false testimonies. The purpose of this study was to investigate 
individuals’ suggestibility to a particular technique that is common across interrogations (i.e., 
misleading questions), with an emphasis on how developing abilities in cognitive control and the 
management of attention impact suggestibility in young children and adults.  
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Suggestibility in Response to Misleading Questions   
Suggestibility is the degree to which a person is accepting of and incorporates another 
person’s suggestion into their memory for an event (Ceci & Bruck, 1993), and could be due to a 
variety of situations (e.g., repeated questioning, social incentives, memory visualization, see 
Ceci, Loftus, Leichtman, & Bruck, 1994; Garven, Wood, Malpass, & Shaw, 1998). 
Suggestibility in response to misinformation (i.e., introduction of false information and details) is 
among the most commonly studied instances of suggestibility dating back to the early 1900s 
(Ceci & Bruck, 1993). Susceptibility to misinformation is typically studied in a three-phase 
structure; 1) participants witness an event, 2) participants are provided with false information, 3) 
participants are asked questions about the event to determine if they incorporated the false 
information provided to them into their memory (Lampinen & Smith, 1995; Leding, 2012). For 
example, in a study conducted by Loftus, Miller, and Burns (1978), participants saw a car 
accident take place and false information about the event was given to the participants while 
questioned about the event “Did another car pass the red Datsun while it was stopped at the stop 
sign?” (in the actual event it was a yield sign not a stop sign). Following this, participants were 
asked to recall details about the event, “Did you see a stop sign?” or asked to recognize a scene 
from the event. The “misinformation effect” occurs when subjects exposed to misleading 
information for that event are more likely than a control group to choose a misleading option 
later during recall (e.g., say “yes” to seeing a stop sign, see Ackil & Zaragoza, 1995; Huff, 
Weinsheimer, & Bodner, 2016; Loftus, 2005). It is assumed that participants who incorporate 
misinformation into memory for the event (Roebers & Schneider, 2000) may create a false 
memory (i.e., memory they believe to be true but did not actually occur or contains inaccuracies, 
Bruck, Ceci, & Hembrooke, 1998; Loftus, 1979; Meade & Roediger, 2002; Leding, 2012).  
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Although misinformation can come from a variety of sources (e.g., talking to others about 
the event, viewing media coverage, suggestive interrogations, Bruck & Ceci, 1999), the most 
common source of misinformation in interrogations is misinformation presented through 
questioning or misleading questions (Ceci, Ross, & Toglia, 1987; Lampinen & Smith, 1995). In 
a misleading question paradigm, the false information is introduced during the second phase of 
the three-phase structure, in the form of a question (see the Loftus et al., 1978 example above). 
In addition to prevalence, another reason why the misinformation during a questioning paradigm 
is so well-studied is because misinformation is often introduced without the interrogators’ 
awareness (i.e., they believe the information they present to be true) or understanding of the 
effect it can have on the subsequent testimony (Bruck & Ceci, 1999). Further, the use of 
misleading questions is especially common with younger populations, because their free recall 
often lacks details (Ceci & Bruck, 1993; Price & Goodman, 1990; Roeber & Schneider, 2000) 
and interrogators supplement questioning with additional information to assist in drawing out 
detailed testimony. Unfortunately, the information provided to children during questioning is 
often inaccurate leading to unreliable and potentially false testimony by children (Ceci & Bruck, 
1993, Garven et al., 1998; Price & Goodman, 1990; Roeber & Schneider, 2000). Although 
misinformation in questioning may be present to a lesser extent when interviewing older children 
and adults, misleading questions still occur because of interviewer bias or to encourage more 
detailed accounts (e.g., to extract the truth when the eyewitness appears to be lying or to reveal 
details that were forgotten due to the traumatic experience of the crime, Ofshe & Leo, 1997).  
In addition to misleading questions being more prevalent in younger samples, the 
introduction of misinformation during questioning has more detrimental effects for younger 
children (Bruck & Ceci, 1999; Cohen & Harnick, 1980). For example, when exposed to 
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misleading questions after having witnessed or engaged in an event, preschoolers (3- and 4-year-
olds) more often incorrectly recognize the misinformation presented during questioning as 
information obtained from the witnessed event and are more likely to give fewer correct accounts 
of the event when compared to school age children (6- to 12-year-olds) and adults (Bruck & 
Ceci, 1999; Ceci & Bruck, 1993; Ceci et al., 1987; Ornstein, Gordon, & Larus, 1992). Further, 6-
year-olds are more likely to incorporate misinformation from suggestive questions into their 
memory for an event compared to 9- to 16-year-olds (Cohen & Harnick, 1980). Thus, preschool 
seems to be a period during which episodic memory for events is fragile and easily affected by 
misleading questions, though older children and adults are not immune to misleading questions’ 
effects.  
Frameworks Explaining Preschoolers’ Susceptibility to Misleading Questions  
Social Frameworks. There are several reasons why preschool aged children may be 
more suggestible to the misinformation effect when presented with misleading questions. 
Socially, young children may fall vulnerable to suggestive information by social pressure (i.e., 
trying to please the interviewer, appealing to an authority figure, Ceci & Bruck, 1993). Research 
has shown that children are more vulnerable to misleading questions when produced by an adult, 
authority figure, a credible adult or child, or a person perceived as truthful, competent, 
believable, and not deceptive (Ackil & Zaragoza, 1995; Ceci et al., 1987; Lampinen & Smith, 
1995; Lippman, 1911; Loftus & Loftus, 1980). Lippman (1911) suggests a child’s thought 
process through an interrogation from a person of authority is as follows: “If the respected 
person who is questioning me expects such an answer, then it must be the right one.” Thus, 
children rely heavily on authority figures and may expect them to be right leading them to 
override their memory or be less confident in it than adults.  
 5 
 
 
Source Monitoring Frameworks. Theories of cognitive explanations for susceptibility 
to misleading questions primarily draw on source monitoring frameworks (Zaragoza & Lane, 
1994, 1998; Lane, 2006). Source monitoring involves cognitive processes that allow for 
representations and retention of the origins of memories to ensure that information is linked to 
the correct source (Hala, Rasmussen, & Henderson, 2005; Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 
1993; Zaragoza & Lane, 1994). While source-monitoring can be a controlled conscious effort 
that is deliberate and involves the use of representations, most often source-monitoring is 
automatic and conducted quickly without conscious awareness leaving room for errors (Johnson 
et al., 1993). The source-monitoring hypothesis suggests that when witnesses are introduced to 
misleading information they may confuse the source of the information with the witnessed event 
itself (Johnson et al., 1993). When responding to misleading questions an automatic response 
may be based on familiarity rather than reflecting on the representation of that memory 
(Zaragoza & Lane, 1994).  
There are individual differences in source monitoring, with better source monitoring 
being associated with resisting suggestibility (Melinder, Endestand, & Magnussen, 2006). Source 
monitoring has also been proposed as a potential reason why young children show more 
susceptibility to misinformation compared to older children. A number of studies show 
preschoolers have difficulty distinguishing between two or more separate sources of events in 
memory when asked to consciously recall the source (Ackil & Zaragoza 1995; Ceci, Crotteau 
Huffman, Smith, & Loftus, 1994; Poole & Lindsay, 1995; Powell, Roberts, Ceci, & Hembrooke, 
1999). Further, major improvements in the ability to monitor external sources dramatically 
increasing between 4- to 6-years of age (Lindsay, Johnson, & Kwon, 1991; Melinder et al., 
2006), likely linked to the substantial achievements in the ability to control and manage behavior 
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and attention during this time period (i.e., in order to monitor sources, one must selectively 
attend to and form a conscious representation for the source of the event).  
One explanation for why children struggle with source monitoring may be due to the 
underdeveloped cognitive processes that assist in source monitoring. The fact that a large body 
of research shows that deficits in source monitoring relate to higher levels of suggestibility 
across the lifespan (Ceci et al., 1994) and preschoolers show substantial deficits in source 
monitoring compared to older samples (Ceci & Bruck, 1993), have led a number of theorists to 
suggest source monitoring deficits as a primary cause for suggestibility to misleading questions 
(Ceci et al., 1994). However, this source-monitoring framework likely only accounts for a 
portion of the developmental progression seen in preschool. Individual contributions of the 
conscious representational systems that allow for conscious reflection (Marcovitch & Zelazo, 
2009) likely underlie and subsume issues with source monitoring. Thus, further work examining 
how the foundational higher order cognitive processes developing during this period (Garon, 
Bryson, & Smith, 2008, Posner & Rothbart, 1998) relate to suggestibility is necessary.  
Cognitive Influences on Preschoolers’ Susceptibility to Misleading Questions 
Executive Function. Broadly, executive function (EF) is defined as higher order 
cognitive processes that underlie goal directed behavior (Epstien, 1973; Jacques & Marcovitch, 
2010; Miyake & Friedman. 2012). Exercising EF is often required when automatic behavior is 
insufficient (e.g., consciously reflecting and recalling a new parking location is necessary to 
avoid automatically walking to your typical but incorrect spot; Diamond, 2006; Wheeler, Stuss, 
& Tulving, 1997). EF plays a role in children’s and adults’ memory with the higher order 
cognitive processes involved in EF thought to assist in encoding and retrieving information from 
long-term memory (Alexander et al., 2002; Miller, Chatley, Marcovitch, & McConnell Rogers, 
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2014; Schacter, Kagan, & Leichtman, 1995). For instance, EF is needed to form a strong event 
representation that can be maintained in long-term memory and is also needed during recall to 
resist the urge to automatically draw on familiarity in memory (Kelley & Jacoby, 2000) and 
consciously reflect on the appropriate memory trace (Marcovitch & Zelazo, 2009). Although 
there are links between EF and suggestibility to misleading questions, there are several important 
considerations that impact EF’s influence on suggestibility. 
First, the structure of EF has been suggested to consist of three core components (i.e., 
inhibition, working memory, and cognitive flexibility, Diamond, 2006; Miyake & Friedman, 
2012), which can relate differentially to social and cognitive abilities (e.g., Miller, Avila, & 
Reavis, 2018; Miller et al., 2014). Inhibition is commonly measured through tasks that require 
individuals to override the tendency to produce an automatic response (e.g., following a rule to 
say a printed color word while inhibiting the tendency to read the words’ ink color, Stroop, 
1935). Working memory (WM) is a process in which information is temporarily maintained and 
manipulated (e.g., completing an ongoing task while maintaining other information in mind and 
using new information to update task completion, Miyake & Friedman, 2012). Cognitive 
flexibility, or set shifting, is the mental process of flexibly shifting between tasks or considering 
multiple mental sets (e.g., switching the sorting of two-dimensional cards from one dimension to 
a different conflicting dimension, Zelazo, 2006). These components are linked to suggestibility 
in adults. For example, to resist suggestibility one must maintain current information about the 
witnessed event in mind, update memory to reflect the sources of information and 
misinformation, inhibit the tendency to rely on more automatic processing (e.g., recalling 
anything familiar about the event, Kelley & Jacoby, 2000; Yonelinas, 2002), and rely on more 
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conscious reflection to separate true information from misinformation when asked to recall the 
event (Kapinski & Scullin, 2009; Scullin & Bronner, 2006).  
Children’s abilities to execute these EF components show dramatic development during 
the preschool years (Garon et al., 2008; Jacques & Marcovitch, 2010), thus, a second important 
consideration in understanding EF’s relation to suggestibility is EF’s development across the 
lifespan. According to Garon et al.’s (2008) integrated framework of EF in development, the 
emergence of simple EF skills and executive attention networks (i.e., regulation of cognitive 
processes to monitor and solve conflicts, Posner & Fan, 2008) together result in complex EF 
skills. Links between EF and suggestibility to misleading questions align with this integrative EF 
development. For instance, the ability to engage in inhibition increases from infancy to 5-years 
of age, with the first instances of inhibition emerging in infancy and children under three 
evidenced in Delay of Gratification inhibition tasks (e.g., inhibiting playing with an attractive toy 
when asked not to, Garon et al., 2008). Inhibition in 3- to 5-year-olds is often measured with 
complex inhibition tasks, requiring holding a rule in mind that is contrary to a dominant response 
and responding according to the rule, such as the Day/Night Stroop (Garon et al., 2008). Higher 
performance on complex inhibitory control tasks are related to less suggestibility when exposed 
to misleading questions in children from 3- to 7-years-old, (Alexander et al., 2002; Clarke-
Stewart, Malloy, & Allhusen, 2004; Kapinski & Scullin, 2009; Roberts & Powell, 2005). 
Initially, WM develops in infancy as holding information in mind over a delayed period of time 
(Garon et al., 2008). More complex skills of WM develop throughout preschool allowing for 
children to hold more information in mind while actively manipulating and updating that 
information, (Carlson, 2005; Cragg & Nation, 2007; Garon et al., 2008). For example, 
preschoolers’ WM is often measured with more complex WM tasks like the Self-Ordered 
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Pointing task (SOPT; Petrides & Milner, 1982), which requires not only remembering a stimulus 
but also choosing new stimuli while avoiding previously chosen stimuli. There is a negative 
relationship between WM and suggestibility in children 3- to 5-years old when exposed to 
misleading questions (Clarke-Steward et al., 2004; Kapinski & Scullin, 2009). Cognitive 
flexibility is often thought of to be the last of the three core components of EF to develop due to 
its prerequisite of both inhibition and WM (Garon et al., 2008). For instance, researchers have 
consistently found that 4-year-olds and most 5-year-olds show major developments in cognitive 
flexibility (i.e., particularly the ability to switch between mental sets) with large improvements 
occurring during the ages of 5- to 11-years, peaking at the early 20’s (Carlson, 2005; Jacques & 
Marcovitch, 2010; Diamond, 2006). Cognitive flexibility has been shown to have no relationship 
with suggestibility to misleading questions in children 3- to 5-years old (Kapinski & Scullin, 
2009), perhaps due to its late development when compared to the other components of EF.  
Although the core components of EF are developing in preschool (Garon et al., 2008) 
there is debate on whether the best way to conceptualize EF is by focusing on component 
processes or a unitary EF ability. Other frameworks of early EF propose that EF may be best 
represented in a unitary fashion during the first 6-years of life (Wiebe et al., 2011), where the 
best model to describe the variability among multiple EF tasks is to extract a unitary factor 
thought to display a common underlying ability known as common EF (i.e., the ability to form 
and maintain representations that guide lower level processing toward a goal, Miyake & 
Friedman, 2012). To date, EF links to misleading questioning research has only been 
investigated in a componential way and suggests that separate abilities in EF such as inhibition 
and working memory may play a role in suggestibility. However, research suggests that EF at 
this age should be measured as a unitary factor because component abilities are not fully 
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developed. Examination of a common EF during this period may be informative and align with 
representational models of EF development (Marcovitch & Zelazo, 2009) suggesting that 
component abilities are not necessarily key to controlled behavior and memory, rather what 
underlies these component abilities is the common ability to form and use representations to 
guide behavior that will be important to long-term memory formation.  
Attention Influences. Attention during encoding of an event may also be a major 
cognitive process that influences suggestibility to misleading questions. More specifically, the 
executive attention network responsible for control over attention and detecting and resolving 
conflict (Rothbart, Ellis, Rueda, & Posner, 2003) is likely important to memory. For instance, 
executive attention is responsible for noticing critical details of a stimulus in the environment to 
recall later (Klenberg, Korkman, & Lahti-Nuuttila, 2001) and some authors even go so far as to 
define memory as selective attention to events or representations (Casey, Giedd, & Thomas, 
2000). Simply not paying attention during an event can result in encoding problems, such as not 
storing the information, resulting in recall issues later (Loftus, 2003). Further, one way the legal 
system identifies an eyewitness as credible and accurate is by determining their level of attention 
during the event (Lane, 2006).  
One way to examine just how important attention is to accurate eyewitness memory in 
response to misleading questions is to examine memory when attention is impaired. Divided 
attention (DA) requires the ability to cognitively process multiple stimuli or perform multiple 
tasks simultaneously (Verhaeghen & Cerella, 2002). Often the results of DA are reflected in 
diminished performance of a task (Johnston, Greenberg, Fisher, & Martin, 1970). Typically, the 
effects of DA are measured by comparing one’s performance on a single task, with one’s 
performance on the same task, while simultaneously performing another task (i.e., dual-task 
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performance, Verhaeghen & Cerella, 2002). In a DA or dual-task paradigm, participants engage 
in a primary task focused on memorizing some specific information while also performing a 
secondary task (e.g., solving mathematical problems or card sorting; Craik, Govoni, Naveh-
Benjamin, & Anderson, 1996; Wimmer & Howe, 2010). This paradigm also has practical 
applications to the eyewitness testimony literature. Eyewitnesses in real world situations are 
often in very stressful environments during the event and attentional resources are frequently 
divided among multiple stimuli (e.g., the event itself, internal details such as thoughts and 
feelings, and external details such as other nearby events), which can affect the quality of one’s 
memory for the event (Zaragoza & Lane, 1998; Lane, 2006).  
Empirical evidence shows that DA during encoding of eyewitness memory can lead to 
errors in adults. For example, Lane (2006) found that when adult witnesses engage in DA (e.g. 
listening to music while witnessing the event) during encoding of the event they were more 
likely to include post-event suggested information into their memory of the event. Further, the 
decrease in memory is enhanced when the secondary task is more complex (Craik et al., 1996). It 
has repeatedly been found that DA has a negative impact on the encoding processes of memory 
(e.g., making the initial memory less detailed) likely because DA reduces the availability of 
attentional resources for complex cognitive processes, resulting in poorer memory recall 
(Anderson et al., 2000; Craik et al., 1996; Fernades & Moscovitch, 2000; Kellog, Cocklin, & 
Bourne, 1982; Park, Smith, Dudley, & Lafronza, 1989). This results in a less elaborate memory 
representation for the event (Lane, 2006), because DA impairs the actual memory when 
compared to full attention (Wimmer & Howe, 2010). When memory representations are missing 
information, we often try to fill in the gaps (Greenberg, Westcott, & Bailey, 1998), this could 
result in increased vulnerability to suggestive information when attempting to filling in the 
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missing gaps in memory. However, the research examining attention links to eyewitness 
memory, let alone misleading questions is lacking. A major gap in the literature is the effects of 
DA on children’s memories. While there is a wide breadth of literature with adults, researchers 
have yet to look at the effects of DA with children when faced with misleading questions, which 
is surprising given the development of attentional networks in the preschool period (Garon et al., 
2008).  
In childhood, there are two general attention systems hypothesized to guide attention: the 
orienting or selective attention system and the executive attention network (Garon et al., 2008). 
The selective attention system allows for exogenously controlled orientation to and shifting of 
attention to an external stimulus, while the executive attention network allows for endogenous 
control where attention is not guided by the environment but rather internally such as through 
representations (Garon et al., 2008; Rothbart et al., 2003). The executive attention network is 
hypothesized to emerge later than the selective attention system, with major developments 
occurring between 3- to 5-years of age in the executive attention network (Garon et al., 2008). 
Further the development of executive attention has been proposed as a cornerstone of controlled 
behavior in EF development because of its assistance in focusing attention to a task while 
avoiding irrelevant information and allowing for control of internal and external information 
processing (Garon et al., 2008). A more developed executive attention network could through 
representation lead to a better long-term memory performance, such as in recalling details of an 
event. Perhaps the development of the executive attention network could also assist in better 
allocation of attention during a DA task, resulting in less detrimental effects of DA on memory 
recall.  
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Developmentally, there are only a few studies examining DA and memory in children 
and none to my knowledge examining DA and suggestibility to misleading questions in memory. 
Wimmer and Howe (2010) found that 7- and 11-year-olds showed decreased memory for word 
recognition when a DA paradigm (e.g., primary task being word memorization and an inhibition 
Day/Night-Stroop task being the secondary task) was administered during encoding and that 7-
year-olds were affected more by DA than 11-year-olds. While Wimmer and Howe (2010) found 
evidence of the effects of DA on memory recognition in children, they did not find evidence of 
false memories as a result of DA. Taken together, DA and suggestibility to misleading questions 
literature suggests older children and adults’ memory is influenced when attention is divided 
during encoding and presentation of misinformation is used during questioning. Development in 
young children suggest that they may show different patterns or be even more influenced 
because of underdeveloped executive attention system - but this work has yet to be conducted.  
The Present Study 
During the preschool period, there are developmental changes in vulnerability to 
suggestibility, with suggestibility to misleading questions decreasing with age (Bruck & Ceci, 
1997, 1999; Ceci & Bruck, 1993). Although this achievement has been linked to development in 
source memory (Melinder et al., 2006), other major cognitive developments during the preschool 
years in EF and attention (Jacques & Marcovitch, 2010) have yet to be examined as cognitive 
influences on suggestibility to misleading questions. The main focus of this research was to 
determine if cognitive abilities (i.e., EF and DA) influence vulnerability to suggestibility through 
misleading information, how this affects preschooler (3- to 5-year-olds) suggestibility, and how 
all preschooler’s suggestibility is comparable to adults.  
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To answer this question, preschoolers ages 3- to 5-years and adults were randomly 
assigned to two conditions, either receiving dual-tasks (i.e., DA condition) or not receiving dual 
tasks (i.e., Full Attention or FA condition) at encoding. All participants were administered three 
EF tasks at the beginning of the session to measure WM, inhibition, and cognitive flexibility. 
Following this, participants watched a video, which was the eyewitness event. Those in the DA 
condition were given additional tasks to complete while watching the video. Those in the FA 
condition were asked to give their full attention to watching the video. Following this, 
participants were given two addition tasks that served as a delay between the witnessed event 
and questioning. These tasks included the Maxi theory of mind task and a Day/Night Stroop task. 
Lastly, participants were asked a series of recognition questions, most of which were misleading, 
then participants were asked the same questions a second time. Total suggestibility was 
calculated by including assents to misleading questions (i.e., Yield score) and answers changed 
from the first time questioned to the second time questioned (i.e., Shift score, Wyler & Oswald, 
2016).  
I had five hypotheses related to the role that cognitive abilities in EF and DA would play 
in suggestibility to misleading information. (H1) I expected children to be more suggestible than 
adults and younger children (i.e., 3- and 4-year-olds) to be more suggestible than older children 
(i.e., 5-year-olds, Ceci & Bruck, 1993). I also hypothesized (H2) that EF would predict 
suggestibility (and potentially be an even more important predictor than age), suggesting that age 
may be a proxy for the rapid development in EF (Garon, et al., 2008; Jacques & Marcovitch, 
2010) that assists in individuals resisting suggestibility (e.g., holding and alternating between 
information in mind may help keep sources straight and result in less suggestibility, Kapinski & 
Scullin, 2009). With EF I hypothesized (H3) that both unitary and component EF 
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conceptualizations would predict suggestibility, but in different ways. Specifically, when looking 
at component EF abilities I expected both inhibition and working memory to contribute to 
suggestibility, however based on the literature I did not expect cognitive flexibility to predict 
suggestibility in children, primarily because cognitive flexibility has not shown to be related to 
suggestibility in previous research which could be linked to its late development when compared 
to other EF components. However, I expected cognitive flexibility to predict suggestibility in 
adults since this EF component would be developed in this population.  
For unitary measures of EF, I expected a better prediction of suggestibility to misleading 
questions for children 3- to 5-years-old, than the individual components since EF is primarily 
measured as a unitary component in the preschool period. However, since EF is often measured 
as components in adults, I expected the EF componential framework to better predict 
suggestibility to misleading questions for this age group. Regarding attention, I expected (H4) 
that those in the DA condition would be more suggestible than those in the FA condition 
(Wimmer & Howe, 2010), but this effect would depend on EF ability (H5). More specifically, 
the eyewitness memory of individuals with lower EF abilities would be more influenced by DA 
because they have less cognitive resources to draw from during eyewitness events. Further, if EF 
abilities are already low, then any disruption in attention would have a greater effect on EF 
abilities, which I proposed would further result in increased vulnerability to suggestive 
misleading questions (Garon, et al., 2008). Lastly, I explored the possible age interactions to 
examine whether age interactions accounts for additional variance once accounting for EF. 
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II Methods 
Participants  
 Participants included 30 3-year-olds (M=3.56, SD=.25), 30 4-year-olds (M=4.42, 
SD=.26), 30 5-year-olds (M=5.37, SD=.30), and 80 adults (M=19.99, SD=1.68). Children were 
recruited from preschools around the Oxford, MS area and from a database of parents interested 
in child development research. Children were tested in both preschools and an on-campus 
laboratory at the University of Mississippi. For their participation, children received a small toy 
(e.g., toy car, figurine). Adult subjects were students from the University of Mississippi SONA 
research pool. For their participation adults were given research credit through the SONA site. 
Of the final child sample, 48 participants were female. Of those who reported demographics the 
majority of children came from households that made between $100,000 – over $140,000 yearly 
(68.26%), 31.74% made less than 80,000. Ninety-Six percent of participants primarily spoke 
English, with 10.1% of participants being bilingual. Eighty-four percent of participants were 
White (non-Hispanic), 1.5% were Black/African American, 9% were Asian/Pacific Islander, 
1.5% affiliated with other, and 4.5% were of multiple races. Ninety-seven percent of children 
came from households were their parents were married. Of the final adult sample, 57 participants 
were female. Of those who reported demographics the majority of households made between 
$80,000 – over $140,000 yearly (65.4%), 30% made less than 79,000, 12% did not report 
household income. Ninety-three percent of participants primarily spoke English, with 15.8% of 
participants being bilingual. Sixty-six percent of participants were White (non-Hispanic), 19% 
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were Black/African American, 10% were Asian/Pacific Islander, and 5% were of multiple races. 
Only 2.5% of adult participants were married.   
Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned into one of two levels of attention, DA condition 
(i.e., receiving dual-tasks) or FA condition (i.e., not receiving dual tasks) during encoding of the 
eyewitness event. All participants were administered the three EF tasks in a fixed order at the 
beginning of the session to measure WM, inhibition, and cognitive flexibility. Following this 
they watched a video. Those in the DA condition were given an additional task (i.e., Day/Night 
Stroop) to complete while they watched the video and were instructed to “please pay close 
attention to the video, as you will be asked some questions about the video later. In addition, you 
will be playing a sorting game in which you need to try to do as well as you can.” Those in the 
FA condition purely watched the video and were instructed “please pay close attention to the 
video, as you will be asked some questions about the video later”. Following this, participants 
engaged in a theory of mind task and a secondary Day/Night Stroop which served as a delay 
between viewing the video and questioning. Participants were then asked a series of yes/no 
questions about events in the video, where 14 out of 18 questions were misleading, see Appendix 
A (Scullin & Ceci, 1999; Wyler & Oswald, 2016). The set of questions were asked a second time 
following negative feedback. All but two tasks (i.e., the SOPT and the DA task) were presented 
to participants on a Surface Pro 3 via the SuperLab 5.0 programming software. 
Pilot Testing 
 This study was piloted on 13 preschoolers (i.e., seven 3-year-olds, three 4-year-olds, and 
three 5-year-olds). Early on it was evident that during the DA task children were not sorting the 
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Day/Night cards while watching the movie. Originally the DA task was performed completely on 
the computer, with the video playing on the top portion of the computer screen and the 
Day/Night Stroop game playing in the lower portion of the computer screen. Children were 
instructed; “please pay close attention to the video located on the top of the screen, you will be 
asked some questions about the video later. In addition, there will be game displayed at the 
bottom of the screen for you to engage while the video plays. You must continue to play the 
game until the video is over. Your score on the game will also be recorded so please try to do as 
well as you can.”. However, children would only sort the card when given reminders “please 
remember to continue the card game”. In addition, some children were performing poorly for 
their age on the Stroop task (e.g., one 4-year-old got 12/50 correct), likely due to focusing their 
attention on the video rather than the game. Given this insight, the Day/Night was altered to 
increase participation by requiring children to physically sort the cards given to them by the 
researcher into boxes the were located directly below the computer screen. This change resulted 
in more participation on the task meant to divide attention (i.e., Day/Night Stroop).  
 In addition, piloting revealed that participants were easily able to accurately recall events 
from the video during questioning when they were directly questioned after the observation, 
regardless of attention condition. Many eyewitness studies include some type of delay between 
witnessing the event and questioning. Researchers suggest that when there is a delay between an 
event and questioning, that new reports given by children during repeated misleading questions, 
are commonly false because children’s memory of the original event fades over time allowing 
for misinformation to fill in the gaps in their memory (Bruck & Ceci, 1999). Further, previous 
research with the VCCS used a delay of 1-3 days and 7-10 days between witnessing the event 
and being questioned (Scullin & Ceci, 2001). For these reasons, a delay was added into the 
 19 
 
 
study. While a delay of a day or longer was not feasible for data collection for this study a 
shorter delay was implanted. Two tasks, a theory of mind task and a Day/Night Stroop task, were 
added between viewing the video and questioning. These tasks served as delay but were chosen 
based on their developmental compatibility to other developmental components and tasks in this 
study. For instance, theory of mind (ToM, understanding that others have thoughts and beliefs 
different from our own, and those thoughts and beliefs drive behavior, Gopnik & Astington, 
1988) is related to the development of EF throughout the preschool years (Miller & Marcovitch, 
2012). In addition, ToM has also been shown to be negatively related to suggestibility (Bruck & 
Melnyk, 2004; Scullin & Bonner, 2006). With these links to other cognitive processes within the 
study ToM could serve not only as a delay task but it could potentially serve as an exploratory 
variable.  The Day/Night Stroop was chosen as it was thought that performance on the Day/Night 
Stroop during the delay could be compared to performance on the Day/Night Stroop during the 
DA paradigm as a way to check whether attention effectively was divided.  
EF Measures 
Dimensional Change Card Sort (DCCS; Zelazo, 2006). The DCCS measures cognitive 
flexibility and is appropriate for individuals from 3 years of age to adulthood (Zealzo, 2006). 
Children and adult versions of the DCCS differed slightly in the number of cards required to sort 
for each phase.  
Child version. For the first two phases there were two target cards (e.g., a yellow car and 
a green flower) and six testing cards (e.g., three green cars and three yellow flowers) that 
participants sorted in a random sequence, see Figure 1. In the preswitch phase participants were 
instructed to sort cards according to one dimension (e.g., color), after all six cards were sorted 
participants moved on to the postswitch phase. In the postswitch phase participants were 
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introduced to the same two target cards but were now instructed to sort according to a different 
dimension (e.g., shape), after all six cards were sorted participants moved onto a second 
postswitch phase. The second postswitch phase had the same two target cards. In addition, there 
were four possible test cards, each with a border and without a border. This phase consisted of 12 
test cards total, with rules that varied based on whether the card had a border or not. Participants 
were instructed to sort by one dimension (e.g., color) if there was a border around the picture, 
however, if there was no border around the picture they were instructed to sort by another 
dimension (e.g., shape). This task was administered on the computer and the total number of 
correctly sorted cards on the first postswitch phase and response times were recorded, each 
response time began as soon as the card appeared on the screen and ended as soon as the 
participant chose a button.  
Adult version. For the first two phases there were two target cards (e.g., a yellow car and 
a green flower) and 12 testing cards (e.g., three green cars and three yellow flowers) that 
participants sorted in a random sequence, see Figure 1. In the preswitch phase participants were 
instructed to sort cards according to one dimension (e.g., color), after all 12 cards were sorted 
participants moved on to the postswitch phase. In the postswitch phase participants were 
introduced to the same two target cards but were now instructed to sort according to a different 
dimension (e.g., shape), after all 12 cards were sorted participants moved onto a second 
postswitch phase. The second postswitch phase had the same two target cards but consisted of 24 
test cards with rules that varied. Participants were instructed to sort cards according to the 
prompt given on the screen, the prompt “color” or “shape” appeared on the screen for each trail. 
Trials were mixed so participants could not anticipate which prompt would appear. This task was 
administered on the computer and the total number of correctly sorted cards on the second 
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postswitch phase and response times were recorded, each response time began as soon as the 
card appeared on the screen and ended as soon as the participant chose a button. 
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2nd Postswitch 
                                                        
  
Figure 1. Dimensional Change Card Sort Task 
 
 23 
 
 
Self-ordered Pointing Task (SOPT; Cragg & Nation, 2007; Petrides & Milner, 
1982). The SOPT measures working memory and is appropriate for individuals 3 years of age to 
adults. There were five levels in this task with each level consisting of multiple cards depicting 
several pictures presented in a different spatial arrangement, see Figure 2. Each level gets 
increasingly more difficult than the last, as the number of cards and pictures on each card 
increases by two. For example, the first level depicted in Figure 2 consisted of four pictures per 
card with four cards total in the level. Participants were presented with cards one at a time and 
were required to point to a different picture for each card they saw (i.e., all of the pictures must 
be touched once), thus they must remember which pictures they pointed to on previous cards to 
select a new picture. After participants were shown all four cards in level one, they move onto 
the next level which consisted of a larger set size (i.e., six pictures per card, six total cards). This 
continued until all five levels were completed, the highest level consisted of 10 pictures per card 
with 10 cards total. No feedback was given at any time during this task, except to remind 
participants of the rules prior to beginning a new level (i.e., “do not touch a picture that you’ve 
already touched”). The number of correctly selected pictures was recorded for each level as well 
the overall total number of errors and overall total correct choices which was out of 40. This task 
was presented in a book format in which the page was turned after each card, there was a blank 
page between levels to indicate the next level was about to begin. There were two versions of 
this task, one administered to children the other administered to adults. As with pervious use of 
this task the child version consisted of pictures on the pages (e.g., balloon, baby, hose, elephant) 
while the adult version consisted of abstract designs on the pages (e.g., large strips, small stripes, 
squiggly lines, chevron lines). The number pictures selected only once out of 40 was recorded.  
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Card 3      Card 4  
Figure 2. Self-Ordered Pointing Task  
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Figure 2. Self-Ordered Pointing Task  
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Stroop Tasks (Gerstadt, Joo Hong, & Diamond, 1994; Stroop, 1935). The Stroop is a 
measure of inhibition. Children and adults received different versions of the Stroop to adjust for 
age appropriateness. Children were administered the Grass/Snow Stroop (Gerstadt, Joo Hong, & 
Diamond, 1994) and adults were given the Stroop Color-Word Task (Stroop, 1935).  
Children Stroop Task Grass/Snow (Gerstadt, Joo Hong, & Diamond, 1994). The Stroop 
Task Grass/Snow measures inhibition in children 3-years and up. The participant saw a green 
grass card and a white snow card on the screen. There were corresponding buttons on the 
response pad with the stimuli. During familiarization, the participant simultaneously heard the 
word “snow” and saw the “snow” card on the screen and was instructed to select the green grass 
button and when the participant simultaneously heard the word “grass” and saw the “grass” card 
on the screen the participant was instructed to select the white snow button, see Figure 3. After 
instructions there were two training trials in which participants sorted a grass card and a snow 
card correctly for each trial before moving onto testing. There were a total of 16 testing trials 
(i.e., presented in random order: g, s, s, g, s, g, g, s, s, g, s, g, g, s, g, s), the total number of cards 
correctly selected out of 16 was recorded. Participants were instructed to respond as quickly as 
possible and their first response was recorded. Participants were not given feedback. This task 
was completed on the computer.  
Adult Stroop Color-Word Task (Stroop, 1935). The Stroop Task measures inhibition in 
adults. Participants were instructed to say aloud the ink color of the word rather than the printed 
word (e.g., for the word “red” printed in the color “blue”, the correct response was “red”, see 
Figure 4). There were three blocks given in the following order; congruent trials (i.e., word “red” 
printed in the color “red”), color of bar trials (i.e., XXXX’s printed in the color “red”), and 
incongruent trials (i.e., the word “red” printed in the color “blue”). Each block had 24 trials 
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within it. Participants were instructed to say the color of the ink for each word or XXXX’s as 
quickly as possible depending on the block and to leave no errors uncorrected. Reaction times for 
each block included the time it took to complete all 24 trials with correcting for errors as 
measured by a stopwatch and the number of correctly labeled trials out of 24 for each block (first 
responses were recorded) were recorded. Interference scores were calculated by subtracting the 
number correct on congruent trails from the number correct on the incongruent trials. A negative 
score would reflect low inhibition while a positive score would reflect higher inhibition. The 
stimuli was presented on the computer, verbal responses were recorded by voice recorder, and 
trials were timed with a stopwatch.  
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Grass/Snow Stroop:  
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Sun/Moon Stroop: 
    
 
Night    Day  
 
 
Figure 3. Children’s Stroop Tasks  
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Figure 4. Adult Stroop Task 
 
 
Red 
Green 
Yellow 
Green 
Yellow 
Green 
Blue 
Red 
Blue 
Red 
Blue 
Yellow 
Red 
Blue 
Yellow 
Blue 
Red 
Blue 
Green 
Yellow 
Red 
Green 
Yellow 
Green 
XXXX  
XXXX 
XXXX  
XXXX  
XXXX 
XXXX  
XXXX  
XXXX 
XXXX  
XXXX 
XXXX  
XXXX  
XXXX  
XXXX  
XXXX 
XXXX 
XXXX  
XXXX  
XXXX  
XXXX 
XXXX 
XXXX  
XXXX 
XXXX 
Green 
Blue 
Green 
Red 
Green 
Blue 
Green 
Yellow 
Red 
Red 
Green 
Yellow 
Green 
Red 
Blue 
Yellow 
Blue 
Blue 
Blue 
Red 
Yellow 
Red 
Yellow 
Yellow 
 
 30 
 
 
Delay Tasks 
 The following two tasks were included to serve as delay tasks between participants 
witnessing the event (i.e., the video) and being questioned about the event. 
 Maxi False Belief Task (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). This task measures theory of mind 
and is appropriate for children as young as 3-years-old. Participants were read a story about a 
character named Maxi who has a false belief about the location of an object, see Figure 5. Maxi 
puts chocolate into cupboard x. While he is gone his mother puts the chocolate into cupboard y. 
When Maxi returns participants are asked two questions; where Maxi will look for the object 
(i.e., false belief question) and where the object really is (i.e., reality question). If participants are 
able to identify that Maxi has a false belief about the object’s location, they would identify 
cupboard x as the cupboard that Maxi would look in, which is different from their knowledge of 
where the object is actually located, cupboard y. Participants responses were recorded as correct 
or incorrect. This task was administered via story book presentation to both child and adult 
participants. 1 
Stroop Task Day/Night (Gerstadt, Joo Hong, & Diamond, 1994). The Stroop Task 
Day/Night measures inhibition in children 3- to 6-years of age. The participant saw a white day 
card and a black night card on the screen. There were corresponding buttons on the response pad 
with the stimuli. During familiarization, the participant saw the “day” card on the screen and was 
instructed to select the night button and when the participant saw the “night” card on the screen 
the participant was instructed to select the day button, see Figure 3. After instructions there were 
 
1 ToM was not reported in the results for two reasons. First it was not a variable of initial interest. Second, while 
this variable could be exploratory, preliminary analysis revealed it was not correlated with suggestibility, resulting 
in no further follow-up analyses, thus it served primarily as a delay task in the present experiment.  
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two training trials in which participants sorted a day card and a night card correctly for each trial 
before moving onto testing. There were a total of 16 testing trials (i.e., presented in random 
order: n, d, d, n, d, n, n, d, d, n, d, n, n, d, n, d), the total number of cards correctly selected out of 
16 was recorded. Participants were instructed to respond as quickly as possible and their first 
response was recorded. Participants were not given feedback. This task was completed on the 
computer.  
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Figure 5. Theory of mind, Maxi False Belief Task  
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Suggestibility and DA Measures  
Suggestibility Video (Scullin & Ceci, 2001). The video was of a child’s birthday party 
and was created by Scullin and Ceci (2001) and lasted approximately five minutes. The birthday 
party was for a boy named Billy and took place at his house with his mother, father, and friends 
(Tammy, Suzie, Robin). During the party Tammy and Suzie peek inside a bag at a present. Billy 
describes his friend Robin as clumsy, she later trips and falls, and drops cake on herself. When 
Billy opens his presents, he sees that his toy (which was in the bag that Tammy and Suzie peeked 
in) is broken and this upsets him. Following this a cake is brought out, Billy blows out the 
candles, and a smoke alarm goes off in the kitchen due to the candles on the cake. Everyone is 
assured that the smoke alarm is a false alarm and the children eat the cake concluding the video. 
Participants are instructed to pay close attention to the video “story” as they will be questioned 
about it later.  
There were two conditions in this task. Participants in the full attention (FA) condition 
were instructed to watch the video. Participants in the divided attention (DA) condition were 
instructed to watch the video, while also engaging in a Day/Night Stroop task (Gerstadt, Joo 
Hong, & Diamond, 1994). The video appeared on the computer screen and the Day/Night Stroop 
was conducted manually with the researcher on the table in front of the computer. The Day/Night 
Stroop was chosen as a secondary task in the DA paradigm because of its previous use as a DA 
task with children (Wimmer & Howe, 2010). During the ongoing task participants were 
presented with 50 trials (i.e., 25 day cards and 25 night cards, presented in random order),  that 
were evenly distributed throughout the five minute video in which participants were instructed to 
place the card in the opposite box of the picture presented (i.e., a Day card goes in the Night box, 
a Night card goes in the Day box). A researcher handed each card to the participant and 
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reminded the participants to “please remember to continue the card task” if they failed to sort a 
card after five seconds of it being handed to them. Typically, the Day/Night Stroop is 16 trials 
however for the task to run for the entire video length it was extended to 50 trials. This 
adjustment was made based on continuous DA tasks in the adult literature. The overall number 
of cards sorted, and the number of correctly sorted cards was recorded to ensure that participants 
engaged in the task as a measure of DA.  
For adults, this task was further altered to include the Grass/Snow Stroop task as well, as 
researchers found it easy to complete the Day/Night task while watching the video without 
dividing attention. Thus, adults had to sort Day, Night, Grass, and Snow cards into their correct 
box (e.g., a Day card goes in the Night box, a Night card goes in the Day box, a Grass card goes 
into Snow box, Snow card goes into Grass box), adults received 100 cards (i.e.,  25 day cards, 25 
night cards, 25 grass cards, and 25 snow cards, presented in random order) to sort throughout the 
5 minute video. The overall number of cards sorted, and the number of correctly sorted cards was 
recorded to ensure that participants engaged in the task as a measure of DA.  
Leading questions (Scullin & Ceci, 2001). A total of 18 forced choice yes/no questions 
about the video were administered verbally by the experimenter after participants completed all 
other tasks. These questions were obtained from the Scullin and Ceci’s (2001) paper on 
suggestibility. Four of the questions were non-suggestive (i.e., where the information was true to 
the video such as ‘Was there a girl named Suzie at the party?’) with the remaining 14 being 
suggestive (i.e., where the information was not true to the video, e.g., ‘Did the two girls arrive at 
the party in a bright red car?’, see Appendix A for a full list of questions). Following all 18 
questions participants went through the questions again under the guise of feedback (i.e., ‘you 
missed a few of the questions. Let’s go through them again and see if you can do better this 
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time’). A yield 1 score was calculated in response to the first administration of the questions (i.e., 
number of assents to suggestive questions during the first administration of questions). A yield 2 
score was calculated in response to the second administration of the questions (i.e., number of 
assents to suggestive questions during the second administration of questions). A shift score was 
calculated in response to the re-administration of the questions during feedback (i.e., changes to 
original answers to the initial question after feedback was given during the second administration 
of questions). A total suggestibility score was calculated by adding the number of yield 1 scores 
to the total number of shifts (Scullin & Ceci, 2001). See Appendix B.  
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III Results 
Missing Data and Descriptive Statistics  
 One adult participant reported being red/green color blind resulting in them being 
dropped from the hierarchical regression and GLM analysis in a listwise deletion. There were no 
other instances of missing data. EF tasks were originally proposed to be analyzed in a unitary 
fashion for children and a componential fashion for adults. However, EF tasks were not highly 
correlated among children or adults, see Tables 2 & 3. Thus, EF tasks were analyzed in a 
componential fashion for both children and adults. Descriptive statistics for each EF task by age 
can be found in Table 1.2 
 
 
2  EF was run as a unitary component for the child sample and revealed a similar pattern of results.  
 
  
 
3
7
 
Table 1                
Descriptive Statistics by Age 
 3-year-olds  4-year-olds  5-year-olds  Adults 
Variables Mean SD Range   Mean SD Range   Mean SD Range   Mean SD Range 
Stroop 13.17 3.24 2-16  13.93 2.60 6-16  13.97 2.74 7-16  -0.06 0.17 
-1.08-
0.17 
Day/Night Stroop 12.33 4.12 1-16  14.20 1.70 11-16  14.57 1.61 10-16  15.85 0.36 15-16 
DCCS 1.17 1.86 0-6  2.57 2.64 0-6  3.80 2.43 0-6  22.91 1.26 19-24 
SOPT 34.37 2.80 28-40  35.50 2.56 29-39  36.63 2.06 32-39  35.33 1.96 30-39 
Yield 1 8.57 3.32 2-14  7.20 3.44 2-14  5.80 3.60 0-14  1.93 1.81 0-7 
Total 
Suggestibility 13.17 4.20 3-21   11.83 4.23 3-20   11.33 4.39 4-25   6.03 4.59 0-32 
Note. Stroop reflects number correct out of 16 on the Grass/Snow Stroop for children and the difference in interference scores 
between congruent and incongruent Stroop trials for adults. Day/Night Stroop reflects the number of correctly sorted cards out 
of 16 for both adults and children. DCCS reflects the number correct out of 6 on the postswitch phase for children and number 
correct out of 24 on the second postswitch phase for adults. SOPT reflects the number of novel picture choices out of 40 for 
both adults and children. Yield 1 scores reflect the number of times both children and adults assented to suggestive questions, 
of which there were 14. Total suggestibility reflects the combination of yield 1 scores and shift scores for both adults and 
children.  
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Table 2          
Correlations Among Measures for Children (N=90) 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Exact Age - .453** .362** .114 -.017 .246* .455** -.281** -.089 
2. DCCS Postswitch  - .195+ .002 -.053 .084 .235* -.067 -.076 
3. SOPT   - .201+ -.021 .385** .301** -.203+ -.082 
4. Grass/Snow Stroop    - .039 .446** .041 -.119 .008 
5. Level of Attention     - .074 .090 .189+ .109 
6. Day/Night Stroop      - .201+ -.197+ -.110 
7. Theory of Mind       - -.169 -.209* 
8. Yield 1        - .671** 
9. Total Suggestibility                  - 
Note. **p<.01, *p<.05, 
+p<.10          
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Table 3 
Correlations Among Measures for Adults (N=80) 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Exact Age - -.204+ -.160 -.023 .273* -.047 .066 .060 -.014 
2. DCCS Mix Trials  - .134 -.013 -.050 .082 -.097 .047 .138 
3. SOPT   - .018 -.013 .070 .019 -.107 -.081 
4. Interference 
Stroop    - -.032 -.055 -.033 -.081 -.020 
5. Level of 
Attention     - .070 .113 .432** .225* 
6. Day/Night Stroop      - .268* .080 .056 
7. Theory of Mind       - .121 .075 
8. Yield 1        - .627** 
6. Total 
Suggestibility                  - 
Note. **p<.01, *p<.05, +p<.10. Correlations with Interference Stroop N=78 due to missing data for 
Red/Green colorblind participant. All other correlations N=80. 
 
 
 40 
 
 
 Performance on EF tasks were converted into Z-scores for the purpose of comparing the 
child and adult populations performance to create a single predictor variable for each EF task. 
The number of correctly sorted cards out of 16 on the Grass/Snow Stroop was a measure of 
inhibition for children, this score was then converted into a standardized Z-score (i.e., averaging 
the mean across all age groups; 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds, and calculating how their score varied 
from the mean). While adults’ incongruent-congruent interference scores for the Color Stroop 
reflected their inhibition score and was converted into a standardized Z-score, to enable merging 
of scores from the two different populations as a single predictor variable, inhibition 
performance, as measured through the Stroop.   
 The number of correct out of 6, on the first postswitch phase of the DCCS was a measure 
of cognitive flexibility for children, this score was then converted into a standardized Z-score 
(i.e., averaging the mean across all age groups; 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds, and calculating how their 
score varied from the mean). The number of correct out of 24, on the second postswitch phase of 
the DCCS was a measure of cognitive flexibility for adults, this score was converted into a 
standardized Z-score to enable merging of scores from the two different populations as a single 
predictor variable, cognitive flexibility performance, as measured through the DCCS.  
 The SOPT, which measures working memory was calculated as the number of correct 
choices out of 40 and was the same measurement for both children and adults. SOPT scores were 
converted into a standardized Z-score to maintain uniformity with other Z-score converted 
variables. Z-scores for the SOPT were created for children across all age groups score (i.e., 
averaging the mean across all age groups; 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds, and calculating how their score 
varied from the mean), and for adults to enable merging of scores from the two different 
populations as a single predictor variable, working memory as measured through the SOPT.   
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The Effects of Age, EF, and Divided Attention on Total Suggestibility 
 To test my hypotheses regarding whether age, EF, and divided attention would influence 
total suggestibility, a hierarchical regression was conducted. Prior to conducting a hierarchical 
regression, the relevant assumptions of this statistical analysis were tested. The assumptions of 
independence, homoscedasticity, and linearity were all met. Although total suggestibility was not 
normally distributed, W (170) = .96, p < .001, there were no floor or ceiling effects in the DV 
and each group has a sample size of 30 or larger, suggesting the use of a hierarchical regression 
to analyze the data was still appropriate (Field, 2013).  
 Preschool Aged Children. Results from the hierarchical regression for the preschool 
sample are presented in Table 4. In the first step, age was entered as a continuous variable to test 
the prediction that age would influence total suggestibility scores. Unexpectedly, results 
indicated that age was not a significant predictor of total suggestibility, explaining only 0.81% of 
the variance in total suggestibility F (1, 88) = 0.71, p = .40.  
In step 2, three EF tasks were entered to determine whether EF contributed to the 
concurrent prediction of total suggestibility scores above and beyond that accounted for by age. 
This step was not significant and only accounted for an incremental 0.50% of variance in total 
suggestibility, F (3, 85) = 0.14, p = .93, nor were any of the coefficients related to the individual 
EF predictors significant, indicating that the individual EF elements did not significantly relate to 
total suggestibility once age was accounted for in the model. 
 In step 3, level of attention (i.e., either DA or FA) was entered to test the prediction that 
those in the DA paradigm would have a higher suggestibility score than those in the FA 
paradigm. This step was also not significant, indicating that level of attention did not 
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significantly influence total suggestibility and accounted for only 1.11% of additional variance in 
total suggestibility, F (1, 84) = 0.93, p = .34. In addition, the interaction between level of 
attention and age on total suggestibility was not significant either and accounted for an 
incremental 0.47% of variance in total suggestibility, F (1, 83) = 0.40, p = .53, see step 4.  
 Finally, to test the prediction that the influence of EF performance on total suggestibility 
would differ by level of attention, step 5 included the interaction of each EF task and level of 
attention. Results indicated these interactions were not significant and accounted for an 
incremental 3.42% of total variance in total suggestibility, F (3, 80) = 0.97, p = .41. Suggesting 
the influence of EF performance on total suggestibility did not significantly differ by level of 
attention. 
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Table 4       
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Children; Influences of Total Suggestibility (Coefficients Listed by 
Step)  
Variable B SE B β ΔR2 CI 95% Significance 
Block 1    .008  .40 
   Exact Age -0.49 0.58 -.09  -1.63 - 0.66 .40 
Block 2    .005  .93 
   Grass/Snow Stroop (No. correct out of 
16) 0.11 0.47 .03  -0.83 - 1.06 .81 
   DCCS (No. correct on postswitch trials) -0.18 0.52 -.04  -1.21 - 0.86 .77 
   SOPT (No. correct out of 40)  -0.26 0.51 -.06  -1.27 - 0.74 .60 
Block 3    .011  .34 
   Attention (DA/FA)  0.89 0.93 .10  -0.95 - 2.73 .34 
Block 4    .005  .53 
   Exact Age by Level of Attention -0.75 1.19 -.40  -3.12 - 1.62 .53 
Block 5    .034  .41 
   Stroop by Attention -0.85 0.96 -.14  -0.92 - 1.81 .38 
   DCCS by Attention -1.55 1.06 -.26  -0.89 - 2.14 .15 
   SOPT by Attention -0.14 1.04 -.03   -1.59 - 1.51 .89 
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  Adults.  Adults were run in a separate hierarchical regression due to the large age gap 
between the adult and child sample and because procedures were slightly different for adult and 
child samples (i.e., DCCS, SOPT, and Stroop are measured differently for age appropriateness). 
Results from the hierarchical regression are presented in Table 5. A hierarchical regression was 
conducted to determine the influence of age, EF, and divided attention on total suggestibility in 
adults. Age was entered as a continuous variable in step 1. As expected, age did not explain any 
variance (R2 < .001) in total suggestibility, F (1, 76) = 0.01, p = .92.  
In step 2, three EF tasks were entered to determine whether EF contributed to the 
concurrent prediction of total suggestibility scores above and beyond that accounted for by age. 
This step was not significant and only explained 3.68% of the variance in total suggestibility 
scores, F (3, 73) = 1.01, p = .43. In addition, the coefficients related to the individual EF 
predictors were not significant, indicating that the individual EF elements did not significantly 
influence total suggestibility once age was accounted for in the model. 
 In step 3, attention (i.e., either DA or FA) was entered to test the prediction that those in 
the DA paradigm would have a higher suggestibility score than those in the FA paradigm. This 
step was significant and explained an incremental 5.15% of the variance in total suggestibility 
scores, F (1, 72) = 4.02, p = .05. Results indicate that those in the DA condition were associated 
with higher total suggestibility scores than those in the FA condition. However, the interaction 
between attention and age on total suggestibility was not significant and only explained an 
incremental 0.19% of variance in total suggestibility scores, F (1, 71) = 0.15, p = .70. Thus, the 
effect of attention on total suggestibility does not change with age.  
 Finally, to test the prediction that the influence of EF performance on total suggestibility 
would differ by level of attention, step 5 included the interaction of each EF task and level of 
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attention. Results indicated this step was not significant and explained an incremental 0.51% of 
variance in total suggestibility scores, F (3, 68) = 0.13, p = .94. Further, none of the coefficients 
related to the interaction between EF and attention level was significant, suggesting the influence 
of EF performance on total suggestibility did not significantly differ by level of attention.  
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Table 5       
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Adults; Influences of Total Suggestibility (Coefficients Listed by Step)  
Variable B SE B β ΔR2 CI 95% Significance 
Block 1    .00  .92 
   Exact Age -0.04 0.31 -.01  -0.66 - 0.59 .92 
Block 2    
            
.04  .43 
   Color Stroop (Interference score) -0.07 0.53 -.02  -1.13 - 0.99 .90 
   DCCS (No. correct on postswitch trials) 0.86 0.58 .18  -0.30 - 2.02 .14 
   SOPT (No. correct out of 40)  -0.51 0.54 -.11  -1.58 - 0.57 .35 
Block 3    .05  .05 
   Attention (DA/FA)  2.18 1.09 .24  0.01 - 4.34  .05 
Block 4    .00  .70 
   Exact Age by Attention -0.31 0.82 -.70  -1.94 - 1.32 .70 
Block 5    .01  .94 
   Stroop by Attention -0.32 1.60 -.06  -3.51 - 2.88 .85 
   DCCS by Attention 0.63 1.20 .10  -1.75 - 3.02 .60 
   SOPT by Attention 0.19 1.10 .03   -1.99 - 2.37 .86 
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 Comparing adult and child samples (Age, EF, and Divided Attention) on total 
suggestibility. In addition to running adult and child samples individually, I also wanted to 
investigate the effects of age (i.e., comparing children to children and children to adults) on total 
suggestibility.  
 To compare the adult and child samples a single GLM was conducted on total 
suggestibility score with age (discrete), EF tasks (z-scores for DCCS, SOPT, Stroop), attention 
(DA/FA), age by attention interaction, and EF by attention interaction as predictors. This 
analysis revealed a significant main effect of age on total suggestibility F (1, 158) = 42.99, p < 
.001. A follow up one-way ANOVA with Fisher’s Least Significant Difference (LSD) post hoc 
comparisons was conducted to determine how age contributed to total suggestibility. For the 
purpose of this analysis age was entered as a discrete variable (i.e., grouped by 3-, 4-, 5- year-
olds, and adults). While 3-year-olds (M = 13.17, SD = 4.20) have the highest total suggestibility 
score followed by 4-year-olds (M = 11.83, SD = 4.23), then 5-year-olds (M = 11.33, SD = 4.40), 
with adults (M = 6.03, SD = 4.59) having the lowest total suggestibility score, there is only a 
significant difference between 3-year-olds and adults, 4-year-olds and adults, and 5-year-olds 
and adults ps < .001, see Table 6. Results suggest that there is an influence of age on total 
suggestibility scores, with children being more suggestible than adults. All other variables did 
not significantly relate to total suggestibility ps > .07.  
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Table 6 
Mean Suggestibility Scores by Age 
Age   Total Suggestibility   Yield 1 Scores   
3-year-olds  13.17  8.57  
4-year-olds  11.83  7.20  
5-year-olds  11.33  5.80  
Adults   6.01   1.90   
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The Effects of Age, EF, and Divided Attention on Yield 1 Scores  
 In addition to total suggestibility, yield 1 scores were also examined. Previous research 
suggests that yield 1 scores may be a better indicator of suggestibility than total suggestibility 
scores (Scullin & Warren, 1999, as cited in Scullin & Ceci, 2001). The following analysis was 
conducted similar to the hierarchical regression above. Children and adults were analyzed 
separately due the large age gap and different methodology between the two samples. All steps 
in the hierarchical regression are the same as the previous hierarchical regression. EF 
components were all analyzed as Z-scores.   
 Preschool Aged Children. Results from the hierarchical regression are presented in 
Table 7. In the first step, age was entered as a continuous variable to test the prediction that age 
would influence yield 1 scores. Results indicated that age was a significant predictor of yield 1 
scores, accounting for 7.89% of the variance in yield 1 scores, F (1, 88) = 7.54, p = .007. This 
reveals that as children are getting older, they are assenting less to suggestive questions (i.e., 
fewer yields), indicating an effect of age on suggestibility in preschool aged children. A follow 
up ANOVA with Fishers LSD post hoc comparisons was run to determine between which age 
groups this significant difference existed. Results revealed a significant effect of age, F (2, 87) = 
4.81, p = .01, with a significant difference between 3- and 5-year-olds, p = .003, only. See Table 
6 for mean yield 1 scores by age.  
In step 2, three EF tasks were entered to determine whether EF contributed to the 
concurrent prediction of yield 1 scores above and beyond that accounted for by age. This step 
was not significant and only explained an incremental 2.12% of variance in yield 1 scores, F (3, 
85) = 0.67, p = .57, above and beyond the variance accounted for by age. In addition, none of the 
coefficients related to the individual EF predictors were significant, indicating that the individual 
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EF elements did not significantly influence total suggestibility once age was accounted for in the 
model. 
 In step 3, attention (i.e., either DA or FA) was entered to test the prediction that those in 
the DA paradigm would have a higher yield 1 score than those in the FA paradigm. This step 
was marginally significant and explained an incremental 3.59% of variance in yield 1 scores, F 
(1, 84) = 3.49, p = .065, above and beyond the variance accounted for by age and EF. Results 
indicated that attention may influence yield 1 scores. Specifically, children in the DA condition 
(M = 7.87, SD = 3.86) had higher scores than those in the FA condition (M = 6.51, SD = 3.22), 
suggesting that DA is may relate to higher suggestibility.  
 Step 4 tested the interaction between DA condition and age on yield 1 scores, this step 
was not significant and explained an incremental 0.09% of variance in yield 1 scores, F (1, 83) = 
0.09, p = .77, above and beyond the variance accounted for by age, EF, and attention. Results 
suggest that age has no influence on the effect of DA on suggestibility to yield 1 scores.  
 Finally, to test the prediction that the influence of DA on yield 1 scores would differ by 
EF performance step 5 included the interaction of each EF task and level of attention. Results 
indicated these interactions were not significant and explained an incremental 0.60% of variance 
in yield 1 scores, F (3, 80) = 0.19, p = .91, suggesting the influence of DA on yield 1 scores did 
not significantly differ by EF performance. 
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Table 7       
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Children; Influences of Yield 1 Scores (Coefficients Listed by Step)  
Variable B SE B β ΔR2 CI 95% Significance 
Block 1    .08  .007 
   Exact Age -1.28 0.47 -.28  -2.21 - -0.35 .007 
Block 2    .02  .57 
   Grass/Snow Stroop (No. correct out of 
16) -0.24 .38 -.07  -0.99 - 0.52 .53 
   DCCS (No. correct on postswitch trials) 0.27 0.42 .08  -0.56 - 1.10 .52 
   SOPT (No. correct out of 40)  -0.39 0.40 -.11  -1.19 - 0.42 .34 
Block 3    .04  .07 
   Attention (DA/FA)  1.36 0.73 .19  -0.09 - 2.81 .07 
Block 4    .001  .77 
   Exact Age by Level of Attention -0.28 0.94 -.18  -2.15 - 1.59 .77 
Block 5    .006  .91 
   Stroop by Attention -0.55 0.77 -.11  -2.08 - 0.99 .48 
   DCCS by Attention -0.24 0.85 -.05  -1.93 - 1.44 .78 
   SOPT by Attention 0.15 0.83 .03   -1.51 - 1.80 .86 
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 Adults. Results from the hierarchical regression are presented in Table 8. In the first step, 
age was entered as a continuous variable to test the prediction that age would influence yield 1 
scores. Results indicated that age was not a significant predictor of yield 1 scores, accounting for 
only 0.40% of variance in yield 1 scores, F (1, 76) = 0.31, p = .58, suggesting that differences in 
age in adults does not have an effect on suggestibility to yield 1 scores.   
In step 2, three EF tasks were entered to determine whether EF contributed to the 
concurrent prediction of yield 1 scores above and beyond that accounted for by age. This step 
was not significant and explained an incremental 3.39% of variance in yield 1 scores, F (3, 73) = 
0.86, p = .47, above and beyond the variance accounted for by age. In addition, none of the 
individual EF coefficients significant, indicating that the individual EF elements did not 
significantly influence yield 1 scores once age was accounted for in the model.  
 In step 3, attention (i.e., either DA or FA) was entered to test the prediction that those in 
the DA paradigm would have a higher yield 1 score than those in the FA paradigm. This step 
was significant and explained an incremental 17.77% of variance in yield 1 scores, F (1, 72) = 
16.13, p < .001, above and beyond the variance accounted for by age and EF. Specifically, adults 
in the DA condition (M = 2.70, SD = 1.91) had higher yield 1 scores than those in the FA 
condition (M = 1.15, SD = 1.31), suggesting that DA is related to higher suggestibility to yield 1 
scores. Step 4 tested the interaction between DA condition and age on yield 1 scores, this step 
was not significant and only explained an incremental 0.06% of variance in yield 1 scores, F (1, 
71) = 0.06, p = .82, above and beyond the variance accounted for by age, EF, and attention. 
Indicating that while attention influences yield 1 scores, attention does not influence yield 1 
scores differently based on age.  
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 Finally, to test the prediction that the influence of DA on yield 1 scores would differ by 
EF performance, step 5 included the interaction of each EF task and level of attention. Results 
indicated these interactions were not significant and explained an incremental 4.24% of variance 
in yield 1 scores, F (3, 68) = 1.29, p = .28. Suggesting that the effect of DA on yield 1 scores is 
not influenced by EF performance.  
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Table 8       
Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Adults; Influences of Yield 1 Scores (Coefficients Listed by Step)  
Variable B SE B β ΔR2 CI 95% Significance 
Block 1    .004  .58 
   Exact Age 0.07 0.12 .06  -0.18 - 0.31 .58 
Block 2    .034  .47 
   Color Stroop (Interference score) -0.14 0.21 -.08  -0.55 - 0.28 .52 
   DCCS (No. correct on postswitch trials) 0.26 0.23 .13  -0.20 - 0.71 .26 
   SOPT (No. correct out of 40)  -0.22 0.21 -.12  -0.64 - 0.20 .30 
Block 3    .18  .00 
   Attention (DA/FA)  1.58 0.39 .44  0.80 - 2.37 .00 
Block 4    .001  .81 
   Exact Age by Attention 0.07 0.30 .42  -0.52 - 0.66 .81 
Block 5    .04  .28 
   Stroop by Attention 0.23 0.57 .12  -0.90 - 1.37 .68 
   DCCS by Attention 0.46 0.42 .19  -0.38 - 1.31 .28 
   SOPT by Attention 0.55 0.39 .21   -0.22 - 1.33 .16 
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 Comparing adult and child samples (Age, EF, and Divided Attention) on yield 1 
scores. In addition to running adult and child samples individually, I also wanted to investigate 
the effects of age (i.e., comparing younger children to older children and children to adults) on 
yield 1 scores.  
 To compare the adult and child samples a single GLM was conducted on yield 1 scores 
with age (discrete), EF tasks (z scores for DCCS, SOPT, Stroop), attention (DA/FA), age by 
attention interaction, and EF by attention interaction. This analysis revealed a significant main 
effect of age on yield 1 scores F (1, 158) = 81.61, p < .001. A follow up one-way ANOVA with 
Fishers LSD post hoc comparisons was conducted to determine how age contributed to yield 1 
scores. For the purpose of this analysis age entered as a discrete variable (i.e., grouped by 3-, 4-, 
5- year-olds, and adults) was a significant predictor of yield 1 scores, F (3, 166) = 54.99, p < 
.001. While 3-year-olds (M = 8.57, SD = 3.32) have the highest yield 1 scores followed by 4-
year-olds (M = 7.20, SD = 3.44), then 5-year-olds (M = 5.80, SD = 3.60), with adults (M = 1.93, 
SD = 1.81) having the lowest yield 1 scores, there is only a significant difference between 3- and 
5-year-olds, and all three age groups for children (i.e., 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds) and adults ps < 
.001, see Figure 6. Results suggest that there is an influence of age on yield 1 scores, with 
younger children being more suggestible than older children and children in general being more 
suggestible than adults. All other variables did not significantly relate to yield 1 scores ps > .18.  
Divided Attention Results  
 This study is one of the first to introduce a divided attention task during an eyewitness 
event in the preschool years. To ensure that our divided attention paradigm did in fact divide 
attention, several analyses were run. Since children were given a different divided attention task 
than adults, separate analyses were run for each sample.  
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 Children. One way to check whether the divided attention paradigm divided attention is 
to look at the answers to non-suggestive questions. Of the 18 questions asked, four are non-
suggestive and should be answered “yes” rather than “no”. It would be expected that those in the 
FA condition would answer more of these non-suggestive questions correctly than those in the 
DA condition, given that they would have paid more attention to the video and there is no 
suggestive influence on those questions. A linear regression was run to determine the effect of 
attention condition on assents to non-suggestive questions. Results revealed no significant effect 
of attention condition on assents to non-suggestive questions for children, F (1, 88) = 2.157, p = 
.15, suggesting that DA did not impair memory for non-suggestive questions. More specifically, 
51.1% of children in the FA condition assented to all non-suggestive questions, while 40% of 
children in the DA condition assented to all non-suggestive questions. While there were more 
children correctly answering non-suggestive questions (i.e., assenting) in the FA condition when 
compared to the DA condition, this difference was not significant. 
 Another way to check whether attention was divided during the DA paradigm was to 
compare performance on the Days/Night Stroop DA task used to divide attention to performance 
on the Day/Night Stroop task given at the end of the session. Since there were unequal trials 
between the two tasks, performance was converted into proportion correct to compare in a paired 
samples t-test. Results revealed no significant difference between performance on the Day/Night 
Stroop during the DA paradigm (M = .87, SD = .21) when compared to performance on the 
Day/Night Stroop at the end of the session (M = .87, SD = .16) for children, t (44) = -.112, p = 
.91.  
 Adults. One way to check whether the divided attention paradigm divided attention is to 
look at the answers to non-suggestive questions. Of the 18 questions asked, four are non-
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suggestive and should be answered “yes” rather than “no”. It would be expected that those in the 
FA condition would answer more of these non-suggestive questions correctly than those in the 
DA condition, given that they would have paid more attention to the video and there is no 
suggestive influence on those questions. A linear regression was run to determine the effect of 
condition on assents to non-suggestive questions. Results revealed no significant effect of 
condition on assents to non-suggestive questions for adults, F (1, 78) = 1.362, p = .25. More 
specifically, 70% of adults in the FA condition assented to all non-suggestive questions, while 
62.5% of adults in the DA condition assented to all non-suggestive questions. While there were 
more adults correctly answering non-suggestive questions (i.e., assenting) in the FA condition 
when compared to the DA condition, this difference was not significant.  
  Another way to check whether attention was divided during the DA paradigm was to 
compare performance on the Days/Night Stroop DA task to performance on the Day/Night 
Stroop task given at the end of the session. Since there were unequal trials between the two tasks, 
performance was converted into proportion correct to compare in a paired samples t-test. Results 
revealed no significant difference between performance on the DA Day/Night Stroop (M = .99, 
SD = .02) when compared to performance on the delay Day/Night Stroop (M = .99, SD = .02) for 
adults, t (39) = -.54, p = .59. These results reveal that performance on the Day/Night Stroop was 
not affected by the DA task.  
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IV Discussion 
The current study sought to examine the influences of cognitive abilities (i.e., EF and 
DA) on suggestibility through misleading questions in preschoolers and adults. Also, of interest 
was how age differences may play a role in their influence on suggestibility to misleading 
questions. There were three major findings of the study. First, children’s total suggestibility and 
yield 1 scores were much higher than adults, however there were only age differences in 
preschoolers for yield 1 scores. Second, EF did not influence total suggestibility or yield 1 scores 
in either child or adult populations. Third, while dividing attention did not have any negative 
effects on total suggestibility in children, it did influence total suggestibility in adults and was 
related to an increase in yield 1 scores for both children and adults, although the increase in yield 
1 scores was only marginal for children. These results indicate that age and attention influence 
suggestibility to misleading questions, however, in the present study EF was not found to have 
an effect on one’s vulnerability to misleading questions.   
Age and Suggestibility. Several researchers have found that age is negatively related to 
suggestibility, with younger children being more suggestive than older children and adults 
(Bruck & Ceci, 1999; Ceci & Bruck, 1993; Ceci et al., 1987; Cohen & Harnick, 1980; Ornstein, 
Gordon, & Larus, 1992). Results of this study showed a significant effect of age on total 
suggestibility and yield 1 scores, with preschoolers being more suggestible to misleading 
questions than adults, supporting previous research findings (Ceci & Bruck, 1993; Cohen & 
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Harnick, 1980). It has been suggested that children are more suggestive than adults 
because of social pressure and immature but developing cognitive processes (Ceci & Bruck, 
1993).  
When examining total suggestibility within our preschool sample, our results did not 
reveal any age differences between the three age groups. Given that Scullin and Ceci (2001) 
suggested yield 1 scores may be a better indicator of suggestibility than total suggestibility scores 
(see also, McFarlane & Powell, 2002; Scullin & Bonner, 2006; Scullin & Ceci, 2001), yield 1 
scores were also examined as a measure of suggestibility. Results revealed a significant 
difference between 3- and 5-year-olds on yield 1 scores, with 3-year-olds being more suggestible 
than 5-year-olds. Further, children were found to have higher yield 1 scores than adults, 
revealing greater suggestibility to misleading questions in children than adults. These finding 
supports previous research findings of a negative relationship between age and suggestibility, as 
age increases suggestibility has been found to decrease (Bruck & Ceci, 1999; Ceci & Bruck, 
1993; Ceci et al., 1987; Cohen & Harnick, 1980; Ornstein, Gordon, & Larus, 1992).  
Yield 1 scores are ultimately one’s initial vulnerability to a misleading question, it is the 
number of assents to suggestive questions. Whereas, total suggestibility is a combination of both 
yield 1 scores and shift scores, recall shift scores are the number of times one changes their 
answer to questions asked previously when given negative feedback. Thus, total suggestibility 
scores reflect two types of suggestibility, suggestibility to misleading questions but also 
suggestibility to repeated questioning. Researchers suggested the use of yield 1 scores over total 
suggestibility to measure suggestibility in preschoolers (Scullin & Ceci, 2001), theoretically this 
approach makes more sense as it reflects a single measure of suggestibility (i.e., vulnerability to 
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misleading questions). In addition, yield 1 scores are a better measure of suggestibility for the 
present study since misleading questions were the type of suggestibility of interest.   
EF and Suggestibility. The current study did not find any relationship between EF and 
total suggestibility or yield 1 scores in either the child or adult populations. This is contrary to 
previous research findings. For instance, two of the three main EF components; inhibition 
(Alexander et al., 2002; Clarke-Stewart, Malloy, & Allhusen, 2004; Kapinski & Scullin, 2009; 
Roberts & Powell, 2005) and WM (Clarke-Steward et al., 2004; Kapinski & Scullin, 2009) have 
been found to be related to suggestibility in children.  
However, while many researchers have found different EF components to be related to 
suggestibility, a review article found that half (i.e., nine out of 18 and possibly more unpublished 
work) of the studies that examined the relationship between EF and suggestibility in children did 
not find a significant relationship between EF and suggestibility (Bruck & Melnyk, 2004). Many 
of these studies examined children under the age of 7-years-old, leading researchers to suggest 
that null findings between EF and suggestibility may be due to the young population used and 
that there may be correlations between EF and suggestibility in older children who are in the 
process of EF growth (Bruck & Melnyk, 2004). However, this argument may not be valid given 
there are major developments in EF processes within the preschool age years (Garon et al., 2008; 
Jacques & Marcovitch, 2010). Further young age does not seem to be a valid argument, in the 
present study EF was not found to be a significant predictor in adults, where EF is considered 
fully developed (Jacques & Marcovitch, 2010).  
Perhaps the inability to find a relationship between EF and suggestibility could be 
explained by performance on EF tasks, in that EF tasks chosen may have proven to be too easy 
for the age groups assessed. Previous research has found inhibition and WM to be related to 
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suggestibility, however in the present study participants regardless of age performed at ceiling on 
measures of inhibition (i.e., Grass/Snow Stroop & Day/Night Stroop) as evidenced by the lack of 
correlations with age and lack of variability in this measure—this may explain why there was not 
a relationship between inhibition and suggestibility. Performance on the DCCS (measuring 
cognitive flexibility) and SOPT (measuring WM) was positively correlated with age, as would be 
expected. However, cognitive flexibility has not previously been found to be related to 
suggestibility, and findings from this study were no different. This is likely due to cognitive 
flexibility’s late development compared to other components of EF (Garon et al., 2008). While 
WM has previously been found to be related to suggestibility, that was not the case in this study. 
While there was some variability in the WM measure, the inability to find a link between this 
component of EF and suggestibility may lie within the measure of WM. For instance, counting 
span, word span, and backward digit span tasks are frequently used as measures for WM in 
research with suggestibility in young children (Bruck & Melnyk, 2004). The SOPT was chosen 
because the backward digit span has proven to be difficult for 3- and 4-year-olds (Vandenbrink 
& Miller, 2019), however the SOPT may have been too easy for this age group as performance 
on the SOPT was negatively skewed for both 4- and 5-year-olds. While performance on the 
SOPT was correlated with age, scores were still very high for older children and there may not 
have been enough variability for there to be a relationship between this measure of WM and 
suggestibility. In addition, the child version of the SOPT was created from the same source as the 
images in the SOPT used by Cragg and Nation (2007), however the chosen images and 
placement of images may have been different and may have resulted in an easier WM task than 
intended for this age.  
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There are a number of theoretical reasons for why EF should be related to suggestibility. 
For example, higher order cognitive processes in EF are believed to assist in encoding and 
retrieval of information from long-term memory (Alexander et al., 2002; Miller, Chatley, 
Marcovitch, & McConnell Rogers, 2014; Schacter, Kagan, & Leichtman, 1995). EF is required 
to form a strong representation of the event for storage in long-term memory, to resist the urge to 
automatically pull from familiarity in memory (Kelley & Jacoby, 2000) and to consciously 
reflect on the appropriate memory trace (Marcovitch & Zelazo, 2009). These three actions that 
allow one to form a memory that can accurately be recalled all rely on EF. Thus, drawing on 
ones EF should decrease the likelihood of suggestibility. While I expected EF to influence 
suggestibility and theoretically it made sense for EF to influence suggestibility, it is possible that 
there may be other cognitive and social abilities that are more related to suggestibility than EF. 
For instance, the present study found that attention influenced suggestibility. Currently results 
are inconclusive as to why EF was not related to suggestibility and future research is necessary to 
determine whether there is a relationship between EF and suggestibility, as current findings are 
mixed.  
DA and Suggestibility. Previous research has found that DA during a witnessed event 
has negative consequences on memory for the event (Zaragoza & Lane, 1998; Lane, 2006), 
specifically DA during encoding of eyewitness memory can lead to errors in adults’ recall 
(Anderson et al., 2000; Craik et al., 1996; Fernades & Moscovitch, 2000; Kellog, Cocklin, & 
Bourne, 1982; Park, Smith, Dudley, & Lafronza, 1989). Findings from this study support 
previous research on DA and suggestibility in adults. Specifically, the present study found that 
adults who were in the DA condition during witnessing an event had higher total suggestibility 
and yield 1 scores compared to adults who were in the FA condition. In addition, findings from 
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the present study were able to extend previous research findings of DA’s negative effects on 
memory to a younger age. The present study found that dividing attention in preschoolers has a 
marginal negative effect on memory, resulting in higher assents to misleading questions.  
These findings align with the theoretical perspective suggesting that when attention is 
required to process multiple stimuli or perform multiple tasks simultaneously the result is 
diminished memory recall (Anderson et al., 2000; Craik et al., 1996; Fernades & Moscovitch, 
2000; Kellog, Cocklin, & Bourne, 1982; Park, Smith, Dudley, & Lafronza, 1989), as was seen in 
the present study. Attention was divided between witnessing an event and performing a task 
simultaneously, which inhibited the executive attention network to properly encode critical 
details of the witnessed event into long-term memory, resulting in poorer memory recall. When 
attention is divided between multiple stimuli a less elaborate memory representation for the 
event is created (Lane, 2006) causing gaps within the memory representations of the event. 
Recall that when memory representations are missing information we often try to fill in the gaps 
(Greenberg, Westcott, & Bailey, 1998), which is likely why both children and adults who 
experienced the DA condition were more vulnerable to the misinformation that was provided to 
them in the misleading questions than those in the FA condition, resulting in higher assents to 
false statements.  
Developing attention systems may be one possible explanation for why DA’s effect on 
suggestibility in children was only marginal. During preschool children are still relying on the 
orienting or selective attention system where their attention is guided by their environment, while 
their executive attention network is developing (Garon et al., 2008). Without the assistance of the 
executive attention network to allocate attention to a single desired event, their attention may be 
easily pull in multiple directions between multiple events. I believe the marginal effect of DA on 
 64 
 
 
suggestibility is likely due to children’s underdeveloped executive attention network, resulting in 
children in the FA condition also experiencing effects of DA, though not intentional through the 
design of the study. For instance, attention could be divided between the video and other stimuli 
in the environment as well as internal events. From this theoretical reasoning I believe that as 
children’s executive attentional network develops the effects of DA on suggestibility will begin 
to look similar to the relationship that is seen in adult populations. Thus, this difference in DA’s 
influence on suggestibility between children and adults is likely due to the development of the 
executive attention system.  
To my knowledge this is one of the first studies to conduct a DA paradigm within an 
eyewitness event for preschool age children. While DA did not influence total suggestibility in 
children, it did have a marginal effect on yield 1 scores in children. Children in the DA condition 
had higher yield 1 scores than those in the FA condition, suggesting that DA is related to higher 
assents to misleading questions in children. Future research should investigate the effects of DA 
on a wider age span in children to assist in determining the influence it may have on children’s 
suggestibility.   
In addition, the marginal effect of DA on suggestibility in children may have a less 
theoretical explanation. The DA paradigm itself may not have effectively divided attention in 
children. Children should have been able to sort all 54 cards within the 5 minutes given to them, 
which is how long the video was. However, the majority of children did not sort all 54 cards, 
suggesting that their attention may have been focus more on the video than on the game. While 
attention could have been divided between the two tasks, it may have been performance on the 
Day/Night Stroop that suffered rather than details about the video. While children’s performance 
on the DA Day/Night Stroop and delay Day/Night Stroop was not significantly different, it may 
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be that children performed equally well because when they did sort cards in the DA Day/Night 
Stroop they sorted them correctly, however the time it took for them to sort the cards may have 
been longer than the time it took them to sort cards in the delay Day/Night Stroop. In addition, of 
the 54 cards available to sort during the task, 20% of children sorted all 54 cards. Children’s 
tendency to allocate attention to the video more so than the game may explain why the effects of 
the DA condition were only marginal. Further, when examining the DA paradigm in adults, of 
the 100 cards available for adults to sort during the task, 74.5% of adults sorted all the cards. The 
majority of adults were able to sort all cards throughout the 5-minute video, suggesting that their 
attention was divided between the two events as was reflected in the significant effect of DA on 
suggestibility in the adult population.  
Divided attention paradigm. The manipulation used to divide attention within this study 
was novel, as to my knowledge there were no existing divided attention paradigms that involved 
witnessing an event in a child population used in previous research. For this reason, it was 
important to examine whether the DA paradigm was effective in dividing attention. Analyses 
examined performance on the secondary task of the paradigm (i.e., the Day/Night Stroop) 
compared to performance on the Day/Night Stroop during the delay. Results revealed no 
significant difference between performance on the DA Day/Night Stroop when compared to 
performance on the delay Day/Night Stroop for children or adults. These results reveal that 
performance on the Day/Night Stroop was not affected by the DA task. However, it is important 
to note that the DA Day/Night Stroop for adults was not as similar to the delay Day/Night Stroop 
as it was in children, since the adult version contained two addition sorting rules and cards (i.e., 
Grass and Snow cards). Thus, it may not be reasonable to draw conclusions regarding DA by 
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comparing performance on these two tasks. While this was one way to check whether the DA 
paradigm was effective, it may not be the best measure of whether attention was divided.  
A second way to check whether the divided attention paradigm divided attention is to 
look at the answers to non-suggestive questions. It was thought that participants in the FA 
condition would have more assents to non-suggestive questions than those in the DA condition, 
if the DA paradigm was effective in dividing attention. Results revealed no significant effect of 
attention condition on assents to non-suggestive questions for children or adults suggesting that 
DA did not impair memory for non-suggestive questions. The present study was able to find an 
effect of DA on suggestibility which suggests the DA paradigm was effective. However, the 
manipulation checks may not be measuring whether the paradigm divided attention as it was 
intended to. Future research is needed to find a valid and reliable manipulation check for the DA 
paradigm to ensure that attention is divided when participants are in this condition.  
Conclusions. One possible explanation for not finding expected relations between 
cognitive abilities and total suggestibility to misleading questions may be the tool used for 
implementing suggestibility, the VSSC. By the authors own admission, in 2006 the VSSC was 
yet to be verified as a reliable tool for assessing children’s suggestibility (Scullin & Bonner, 
2006). Researcher’s suggested that further research would be needed to determine the VSSC’s 
utility as a tool for assessing children’s suggestibility and perhaps this research may lend itself as 
just that. The findings from this study would suggest that perhaps the video, the questions (both 
suggestive and non-suggestive), or the combination of both are not creating the appropriate tool 
to measure suggestibility to misleading questions in children. Further, previous findings from use 
with the VSSC show that it is much more likely that the yield 1 scores are a better predictor of 
suggestibility than the total suggestibility score (Scullin & Bonner, 2006; Scullin & Ceci, 2001). 
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Researchers have even suggested that the yield 1 scores may be acceptable as a measure of 
overall suggestibility (Scullin & Warren, 1999, as cited in Scullin & Ceci, 2001). Thus, future 
research should focus on yield 1 scores as a measure of suggestibility rather than total 
suggestibility scores as this study adds to the findings that yield 1 scores are a better measure of 
suggestibility in children.  
In conclusion, the present study was able to replicate findings of the negative relationship 
between age and suggestibility. Further, this study was able to replicate the relationship between 
DA and suggestibility in adults and to extend this relationship to a younger age than previously 
examined. Lastly, the present study was not able to find a relationship between EF and 
suggestibility in children or adults.  
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Appendix A 
Leading Questions & Video Suggestibility Scale for Children (Video SSC; Scullin & Ceci, 
2001): 
S; suggestive questions, NS; non-suggestive questions. 1) Did the two girls arrive at the 
party in a bright red car? (S). 2) Was there a girl named Suzie at the party? (NS). 3) Was there a 
little white doggie at the party? (S). 4) Did that clumsy girl Robin knock over the lamp? (S). 5) 
Did the kids break a balloon while they were hitting them around? (S). 6) Did Robin trip and fall 
on the way to the table? (NS). 7) When the clown juggled, did he drop a ball? (S). 8) Was Billy 
going to bring his new football to school the next day? (S). 9) Was one of Billy’s birthday 
presents broken when he opened it? (NS). 10) Did Billy break the toy? (S). 11) Did Billy and his 
friends play with the broken toy after Billy’s dad fixed it? (S). 12) Did Billy’s dad cut the 
birthday cake? (S). 13) When Robin dropped the cake on her lap, did she just go ahead and eat 
it? (NS). 14) When Billy spilled his juice, did he cry? (S), 15) Did Billy get the last piece of 
cake? (S). 16) Did Billy’s dad tell the kids that there wasn’t a real fire? (S). 17) Did Billy feel ‘all 
grown up’ now that he was five years old? (S). 18) Did Billy’s friends stay overnight? (S).  
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Appendix B 
Video Suggestibility Scale for Children (Video SSC): The scale measures 
suggestibility in two dimensions; Yield, the initial response to the misleading questions. Shift, 
after responding to the initial questions mild negative feedback is given (e.g. ‘you missed a few 
of the questions. Let’s go through them again and see if you can do better this time’) and the 
questions are administered again. Total suggestibility is the combination of scores on the two 
dimensions (i.e., yield and shift).  
Yield 1: Children are given a score of 1 if they assent to a leading question. Four of the 
questions are true and thus cannot be scored (but are included in questioning) for this part of the 
analysis resulting in a range of scores from 0-14.  
Yield 2: Children are given a score of 1 if they assent to a leading question after 
receiving negative feedback (i.e., ‘you missed a few of the questions. Let’s go through them 
again and see if you can do better this time’) from the experimenter and the question is repeated. 
Again the 4 true questions cannot be scored (but are included in questioning) for this part of the 
analysis resulting in a range of scores from 0-14. 
Shift: During questioning the child is told “you missed a few of the questions. Let’s go 
through them again and see if you can do better this time.” If the child changes their response 
after hearing this they are given a 1. The 4 true questions were included resulting a range of 
scores from 0-18.  
Total suggestibility: A composite suggestibility score was created by summing Yield 1 
and Shift scores, resulting in a range of scores from 0-32.  
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